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The Evolution of Morality
Matthew Rutherford
INTRODUCTION
Influential biologist, surgeon and philosopher Thomas Huxley argued the case, in his
famous lecture Evolution and Ethics (1894), that human nature is essentially evil: the
consequence of a cruel and unforgiving natural environment. Huxley, a staunch
supporter and friend of Charles Darwin, suggested that morality was simply a human
cultural construction, created in order to counter egotistical human nature.1 However,
it is now clear that moral systems occur and are adhered to universally across cultures,
indicating that contrary to Huxley’s beliefs morality does have evolutionary origins
and is a fundamental component of human nature.2
These issues are part of what is arguably one of the most significant debates of
contemporary science and philosophy: the extent to which evolutionary processes
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Morality is essential to human identity. Since Darwin and Wallace
proposed natural selection to explain the complexities of organisms,
evolutionary biologists have sought explanations for all aspects of
human nature including morality. One way to establish how far
morality is exclusive to humans is to examine moral precursors in
closely-related species. The advantage of such a characteristic initially
seems contrary to the ‘selfish’ process of natural selection, however
various ways in which such a trait has adaptive value have been
proposed. Also, the extent to which morality is actually part of human
identity, a product of sophisticated human culture rather than being
hard-wired into our minds by evolutionary process, is a fascinating and
current area of scientific dialogue.
influence contemporary human behaviour and cognition. Ever since Darwin and
Alfred Russel Wallace proposed their influential treatises on ‘descent with
modification’, leading evolutionary biologists have put forward the idea that
seemingly exclusive human characteristics such as morality are a result of the natural
selection process. However, since the arrival of new social scientific disciplines such as
psycho-analysis at the turn of the 20th century, there has been a separate school of
thought, that all human behaviour is culturally determined, that the mind has
essentially evolved into a “blank slate”.3
The debate can be advanced through various avenues. Examining the behaviour of
closely related species to determine if it is analogous or homologous to our own can
help establish to what extent morality is a product of natural selection. Consideration
of the adaptive value of morality is also crucial to furthering our understanding of the
issue.
MORALITY DEFINED
In the response to discussion of their recent review Jessica C. Flack and Frans B. M. de
Waal first highlight the difficulty of attempting to define a concept with so many
potential interpretations before offering this “broad characterisation”:
We understand morality as a sense of right and wrong that is born out of
group-wide systems of conflict management based on shared values.4
This definition is similar to Alexander’s (1987), where morality is characterised as
based on systems of indirect reciprocity and Boehm’s (2000), which indicates it is the
result of common principles imposed on the individual by the group.5 Flack and de
Waal go on to describe an arrangement of regulations and incentives to settle group
3 Debra Lieberman, John Tooby and Lada Cosmides, “Does Morality have a Biological Basis? An
Empirical Test of the Factors Governing Moral Sentiments Relating to Incest”, Proceedings of
the Royal Society 270 (2003): 818.
4 Jessica C. Flack and Frans B. M. de Waal, “Being Nice Is Not a Building Block of Morality
Response to Commentary Discussion”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, No.1–2 (2000): 67–
77.
5 Richard D. Alexander, The Biology of Moral Systems (Hawthorne, NY: Aldinede Guyter,
1987); Christopher Boehm, “Conflict and the Evolution of Social Control”, Journal of
Consciousness Studies 7 (Special Issue on Evolutionary Origins of Morality) (2000): 79-183.
rivalries and disputes in the service of the ‘greater good’; the individual benefits from
resource distribution and collective action. Therefore, according to this definition,
prosocial behaviour is integral to morality.6
MORAL MONKEYS?
Considering the degree to which other closely related species possess morals or moral
precursors helps us to establish whether our common ancestor was a moral being and
contributes to the debate on the extent to which morality is indeed an evolved
behaviour or is a cultural phenomenon. Darwin’s thoughts on the extent to which
animals possess ethical values are related to the creature in question’s cognitive ability:
Any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental
and filial affections being here included, would inevitably acquire a moral sense
or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed,
as in man.7
Darwin seems quite confident that, provided a creature is sufficiently intellectually
developed, it will be able to absorb morality from its relations. In more recent years
proponents of Huxley’s position (stated above) have suggested a more extreme view of
human nature. In 1976 the evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins explained that
people are “born selfish” and that in seeking to build a world in which individuals
work together in an altruistic fashion we can expect little help from our genetic
makeup.8 Renowned evolutionary biologist George C. Williams accounts for the
presence of morality in a slightly different manner:
I account for morality as an accidental capability produced, in its boundless
stupidity, by a biological process that is normally opposed to the expression of
such a capability.9
6 Ibid.
7 Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1982).
8 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976).
9 George C. Williams, “Reply to Comments on ‘Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics in a
Sociobiological Perspective’”, Zygon, 23 (1988): 383–407.
However, Flack and de Waal question Dawkins in that, if morals are not biologically
inherent then what force aided humans in denying their nature and establishing
societal norms. They also put it to Williams that if morality is an evolutionary
accident, then why has natural selection not dealt with it appropriately as it would
any other trait which has no adaptive value. It is the lack of substance of these
positions that have encouraged Flack and de Waal to review the existence of
foundations of morality in non-human primates. The framework that they apply for
addressing such issues proposes that the origins of morality can be explained by
evolutionary biology but that the specifics of our contemporary moral structures
should be analysed in a different manner.10
Food-sharing in animal communities can be used as a tool to assess the occurrence of
moral behaviour. De Waal has repeatedly investigated the food sharing tendencies of
brown capuchin monkeys and chimpanzees.11 In one experiment, adult capuchins
were broken up into pairs and placed in a test compartment separated into two
sections divided by a mesh partition. The individual with access to food was free to
consume it all by himself or to actively or passively (by allowing the other monkey to
have dropped pieces) share it. The set-up was then rearranged so that the second
individual had access to the food. Reciprocal sharing was observed, albeit with some
variation between the sexes; females were inclined more to reciprocal sharing, while
males were less selective in terms of who they shared with and were more liberal with
amounts given. Although this experiment was conducted in an artificial environment,
similar observations have been made in colonies and in the wild.12
This type of sharing can be described as symmetrical reciprocity, that is, a by-product
of frequent association. However if calculated reciprocity, which is based on the
ability to keep mental note on favours given and received, can be demonstrated, then
more cognitively demanding decisions must be undertaken, which point towards the
possession of expectations in these non-human primates. Another manner in which
calculated reciprocity is displayed is in the retributive behaviour of chimpanzees. This
form of reciprocity requires prescriptive rules and expectations which, Flack and de
Waal say, “essentially reflects a sense of social regularity, and may be a precursor to
10 Flack and Waal, Any Animal Whatever, 1-29.
11 E.g., Frans B. M. de Waal “Food-sharing and Reciprocal Obligations in Chimpanzees, Journal
of Human Evolution 18 (1989): 433-459; Frans B. M. de Waal, “The Chimpanzee’s Service
Economy: Food for Grooming”, Evolution and Human Behavior, 18 (1997): 1-12.
12 Ibid.
the human sense of justice”.13 Their conclusions are criticised, notably by Jerome
Kagan, who argues that human morality is defined by intention, not by behaviour and
due to the fact that biologists cannot know animal’s intentions they should not
automatically classify certain behaviour which benefit another as necessarily
altruistic.14 To what extent these reciprocity mechanisms are cognitively mediated
remains uncertain, but at least for chimpanzees there is evidence for the function of
memory and expectation.
Community concern is another building element of morality which has been observed
in certain primate populations.15 Flack and de Waal cite the example of a female who
demonstrates this concern in trying to resolve a conflict in which she played no part
and thus restoring a relationship that is not her own. Such examples are probably rare
in primates, and many only occur significantly in apes. Also an empathetic behaviour,
‘active consolation’, is well documented in chimpanzees. This consists of a third party
advancing towards and connecting with a recipient of aggression following a physical
confrontation. An example would be a juvenile approaching and embracing an adult
male who has just lost a fight with a competitor.
The question remains, are non-human primates capable of actual concern for others
founded on considering an individual’s perspective? There is some evidence to
advocate that apes are capable of cognitive empathy in a similar way to humans but
whether monkeys possess a less substantial model of this ability is still uncertain. The
fact that certain ‘building blocks’ of morality can be observed in non-human primates
suggests that our common ancestors were likely to have possessed similar traits and
therefore indicates that components of morality are evolutionarily advantageous.
ADAPTIVE VALUE
Despite the fact that numerous moral theorists and biologists are dubious that natural
selection can produce components of moral systems such as the capacity for sympathy
and empathy or even the capacity for non-kin based cooperation that requires the
suspension of short term, independent interests, there also exists a tradition going
13 Ibid.
14 Jerome Kagan, “Human Morality is Distinctive”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, No.1–2,
(2000): 46–48.
15 Flack and de Waal, Any Animal Whatever, 1-29.
back to Petr Kropotkin (1902) which suggests that the animals assist each other
specifically because by doing so they achieve long term, collective benefits of greater
value than the short term benefits derived from straightforward competition. More
recently Robert Trivers has forwarded his concept of ‘reciprocal altruism’ in which
unlike simultaneous cooperation, acts are carried out that while being valuable to the
recipient, are costly to the performer. This inequality is eliminated as soon as a good
deed of equivalent significance is returned.16
Bernard Thierry however explains that evidence regarding this phenomenon of
calculated reciprocity in chimpanzees is still questioned, but that this does not detract
from the potential adaptive value of systems that enhance exchanges and lower
conflicts of interest. He crucially cites Stephen J. Gould and Elisabeth S. Vrba (1982):
the use of characteristics that were not primarily intended for their current function is
a principal mechanism of evolution. These features, such as cognitive skill and
motivational dispositions, may have represented a source of raw material for the
ensuing development of morality.17
Professor of Psychiatry and Psychology at the University of Michigan, Randolph M
Nesse is a critic of the position adopted by Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson
(1998) that for characteristics such as morality and altruism to have evolved, group
selection must have been required. Randolph Nesse maintains that, although models
have demonstrated that group selection can occur under stringent conditions, it is
neither necessary nor sufficient. He suggests that the advantage may come from sexual
selection, social selection, or the adaptive value for a capacity for commitment, and
also possibly from cooperation and kin selection. On an issue of terminology,
interestingly and crucially, he cites the difference between altruism and selfishness
and ‘evolutionary altruism’ and ‘evolutionary selfishness’, noting that the use of
morality as a metaphor in evolutionary biology has lead to a substantial degree of
confusion!18
Darwin was familiar with the philosophy of David Hume and Adam Smith and was
aware that Hume’s thinking on human nature fitted his own perspective that the two
16 Ibid.
17 Bernard Thierry, “Building Elements of Morality are not Elements of Morality”, Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 7, No.1–2, (2000): 60–62.
18 Randolph Nesse, “How Selfish Genes Shaped Moral Passions”, Journal of Consciousness
Studies, 7, No.1–2 (2000): 227–231.
aspects of human nature, the dark, competitive side, and the cooperative and
compassionate side could co-exist as evolutionary strategies.19 This position seems to
be an appropriate point from which the debate on the adaptive value of morality can
be explored.
EVOLVED BEHAVIOUR VS. CULTURALLY DETERMINED
In their investigation of how incest is viewed in terms of morality, Debra Lieberman
et al. distinguish between two potential mechanisms of cultural transmission in
relation to moral sentiments regarding third-party sibling incest; vertical and
horizontal. The vertical model contends that offspring absorb parental attitudes
towards sexuality. However when length of co-residence with an opposite-sex sibling
is controlled for, the relationship between parental attitudes and children’s own
perception of sibling-incest drops and ceases to be significant. The second route of
cultural transmission is through the immediate social environment i.e. peer attitudes.
Lieberman et al suggest that if peer attitudes do have an effect, these would be
mirrored in the subject’s own position towards sexual behaviour, and the subject’s
restrictiveness and judgements of moral wrongness related to sibling incest would be
correlated. However there was no correlation. Taken together, the conclusions related
to horizontal and vertical cultural transmission indicate that morality regarding incest
is acquired by other means than cultural transmission.20
Sandra and Werner Güth, as well as noting Flack and de Waal’s lack of consideration
of immorality as an evolved behaviour, tend to favour ‘cultural evolution’ over
genetic. They make the point that to imagine all the social conduct of primates to be
based on instinct would require a much too complex genotype. They instead propose
that evolution’s ‘escape route’ was to develop a costly brain capable of cognition and
calculated choices with the capacity to assess one’s social environment and the likely
consequences of one’s actions. However, they do accept that morality indefinitely
requires many genetically determined facilities. To further establish to what extent
morality is an evolved phenomenon, they suggest observing primate individuals
brought up outside their natural environment interact with zoo or wild populations.21
19 Flack and de Waal, “‘Any Animal Whatever’ Darwinian Building Blocks of Morality in
Monkeys and Apes”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 7, No.1–2 (2000): 1–29.
20 Lieberman et al., Morality, 818.
21 Sandra Güth and Werner Güth, “Morality Based on Cognition in Primates”, Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 7, No.1–2 (2000): 43–46.
CONCLUSION
As our understanding of what makes us human continues to expand and deepen, and
as it becomes clear that so much of our nature is determined by a ruthless, unthinking
process such as natural selection, it is crucial to realise that we should not revert to
some form of Social Darwinism or use this interpretation of ‘nature’s way’ to guide or
justify our behaviour.
Humans may indeed be the only actual moral beings; even though it is arguable that
several elements necessary to human morality can be demonstrated in other primates,
there is no reason to believe that other animals have moral systems that reflect the
intricate nature of our own.
According to the vast majority of traditional religious thought humans were created
rather than having evolved. As a result of this we have grown attached to the notion
of considering ourselves to be unique and qualitatively superior. It is essential to
advancing understanding of our existence that we continue to question such
established doctrines.
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